This is a Public Office Covenant working paper (July 2026, revised October 2026). It looks at where UK practice on proscription, protest sentencing and state secrecy differs from comparable democracies, and where the state's defenders have a real case. It sits alongside S2_02 Public Office Covenant and is written to stand alone.
1. The numbers
UK standing - In the RSF World Press Freedom Index 2026 the UK ranks 18th of 180 (score 79.45), in the "satisfactory" tier. RSF flags lawsuits used to silence journalists (SLAPPs) and low public trust in the media.1 - Norway ranks first, and Denmark and Sweden also rank well above the UK.
Proscription - Palestine Action was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 in July 2025, after activists damaged two aircraft at RAF Brize Norton with paint. - Thousands of people have since been arrested for showing support for the group, more than 3,600 by September 2026 on campaigners' and press counts. They include people holding signs reading "I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action" at silent vigils.2 - In February 2026 the High Court found the proscription unlawful and disproportionate, finding that only a very small number of the group's actions amounted to terrorism and that its scale did not yet justify a ban.3 The government is appealing, and the ban stayed in force pending a further hearing.4 - In June 2026 the Court of Appeal overturned that finding and ruled the proscription lawful. Further appeals are expected.3
Sentencing without the terrorism label - The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 created a statutory offence of intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance, with a maximum sentence of 10 years. - Five Just Stop Oil organisers of the 2022 M25 gantry protests, the "Whole Truth Five", were convicted of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance and sentenced to 4 to 5 years. In March 2025 the Court of Appeal reduced the sentences to between 30 months and 4 years.5 - No terrorism label was used or needed to reach multi-year prison sentences for organising a non-violent blockade.
Secrecy powers - The Ministry of Defence's superinjunction over the Afghan data leak was in force from September 2023 to July 2025, about 22 months. It was contra mundum (binding everyone, not just named parties) and hid the existence of the order itself from the public and from Parliament. Once it was lifted, Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee demanded the court documents immediately.4 - Keeping it in place cost £2.4m in legal fees.4 - Journalists giving evidence to the Defence Committee said it put democratic scrutiny "in the deep freeze".6
2. International comparison
| Country | Mechanism | Key design feature |
|---|---|---|
| USA | Brandenburg test (incitement to imminent lawless action) for speech; separate "material support" laws for designated foreign terrorist organisations | A very high bar for restricting speech in general, but Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010)7 shows the US also criminalises non-violent coordination with a listed group. The assumption that "the US never does this" doesn't fully hold for coordination and material support |
| Germany | Association bans (Vereinsverbot) under Article 9(2) of the Basic Law;8 the "militant democracy" doctrine | Bans target an organisation's structure and conduct, and courts require proof of unconstitutional aims, not isolated acts by members. Supporting a banned group's structure and publicly displaying its symbols are offences, but voicing agreement with its aims is not, in itself9 |
| Norway | Article 100 of the Constitution10 places a positive duty on the state to enable open public debate; no equivalent offence of expressing sympathy for a banned group | Media ownership transparency and public funding support a healthy media rather than criminalising fringe political sympathy |
| UK | Terrorism Act 2000 proscription criminalises inviting or expressing support, not only membership and coordination | The broadest of the comparators examined: none of the others criminalises a placard expressing sympathy on this scale |
The key UK difference from Germany's comparable framework is narrower than often claimed, but real. Germany also punishes displaying a banned group's symbols and helping keep it going. What it doesn't do is make an individual's expression of agreement with the group's aims an offence in itself. UK proscription law does. That is the specific point where the UK departs from comparable democracies, not the existence of proscription powers as such.
3. Steel man: the case for current UK practice
On proscription: - Ordinary criminal law struggles with organised, repeated, coordinated campaigns against strategic sites such as defence factories and military bases in a way it doesn't with one-off vandalism. Treating a campaign differently from a single act is a legitimate legal distinction, not an abuse. - The Court of Appeal's judgment reflects serious judicial scrutiny, not executive fiat. The proscription was tested and retested in the courts, which is the system working as designed.
On superinjunctions: - The MoD argued that disclosure could hand the Taliban a list of targets. A High Court judge accepted that as a serious risk to life, not a pretext. - Some secrecy is legitimately temporary rather than permanent. This superinjunction was eventually lifted, and the courts set conditions throughout its life rather than granting an unreviewable blank cheque.
4. Where the state went too far, and what should change
4.1 Separate conduct from sympathy in proscription law
Problem: Vandalism, break-ins and organised property destruction are crimes and should be prosecuted firmly under ordinary law. The Just Stop Oil cases show this can be done without a terrorism label, using existing (if recently toughened) public nuisance and criminal damage laws. Proscription goes further by criminalising expressions of political sympathy for an organisation's cause, which is a different act from the crimes themselves.
Reform: Amend the Terrorism Act 2000 so that proscription orders can restrict an organisation's operations (recruitment, coordination, funding and logistics) without automatically criminalising public expressions of support for its stated cause. Someone praising a proscribed group's aims should not face the same liability as someone coordinating its next break-in.
Trade-off: The government will argue this creates a grey area: where does "I support the cause" end and a signal of willingness to be recruited begin? A narrower offence is harder to prosecute at the margins than a blanket one. Some ambiguity is the price of protecting a much larger amount of legitimate political speech from casual criminalisation.
Cross-pillar flag, Defence: Any redraft must keep the state's ability to disrupt violent extremist recruitment networks. This reform targets expressions of sympathy, not the powers to disrupt organisations.
4.2 Expiry dates and judicial review for proscription orders
Problem: Proscription orders have no automatic expiry and no requirement to be re-justified periodically against current evidence.
Reform: Require proscription orders to be reviewed and re-justified before a judge, not just the Home Secretary, at fixed intervals (for example every 24 months), with the burden on the state to show they are still necessary based on current conduct, not conduct from years before.
Trade-off: This adds administrative and court workload. Organisations that are clearly dangerous would be re-certified without difficulty, so the practical cost falls almost entirely on borderline cases, which is exactly where scrutiny is most needed.
4.3 Time limits on superinjunctions and compulsory notice to Parliament
Problem: A 22-month contra mundum order kept Parliament in the dark, and no mechanism guaranteed that even the Intelligence and Security Committee, Parliament's own oversight body for this kind of national security matter, was told. That is a failure of oversight itself, not just an inconvenience to the press.
Reform: - A legal maximum duration for superinjunctions (for example 6 months), renewable only at a fresh court hearing with evidence that they are still needed. - A compulsory, legally protected notice to the Intelligence and Security Committee (or an equivalent cleared committee) when an order is granted, however secret it stays from the public. Oversight and public disclosure are different things and shouldn't be bundled together.
Trade-off: The government will argue that even telling a small committee creates a risk of leaks. Intelligence oversight committees routinely handle classified material under strict rules, which suggests the risk is manageable and is already the normal basis for handling comparable secrets.
Cross-pillar flag, Public Office Covenant (core): This is a direct failure of accountability, the same kind of "informed consent to secrecy" issue the Covenant addresses elsewhere for executive oversight.
4.4 Write a high bar for prior restraint into law
Problem: UK courts grant privacy and national security injunctions more readily than US courts, where the default is to publish and litigate afterwards. This is a difference in the system, not in individual cases.
Reform: Legislate a presumption against prior restraint modelled on the Pentagon Papers standard. Injunctions, and especially superinjunctions and contra mundum orders, should require the state to show near-certain, serious and imminent harm from publication itself, not merely that the underlying facts are true.
Trade-off: This is the most politically difficult recommendation, because it affects privacy law generally, not only national security cases. Expect resistance from claimant lawyers as well as government.
5. Where the state's critics overstate the case
For balance, and to head off bad-faith framing from either side: - The claim that Britain has "no free speech" isn't supported by the RSF data. 18th of 180, ahead of the US, is a strong global position. - Ordinary anonymised privacy injunctions, which protect private individuals rather than political speech, aren't part of this problem and shouldn't be swept into the same reform package. Lumping them in with proscription and superinjunctions weakens the case for reform. - The Just Stop Oil cases show the state doesn't need the "terrorism" label to secure long sentences. That undermines claims that only Islamist or pro-Palestinian causes are targeted: harsh sentences have been handed down for environmental protest under an entirely separate law.
6. Relationship to the Public Office Covenant
This document is published as a standalone working paper rather than merged into S2_02 Public Office Covenant. Both deal with the same failure: legal mechanisms being used because they achieve a desired outcome, rather than because the facts meet the threshold the mechanism was designed for. Whether this material should eventually become a subsection of S2_02 or stay a separate companion document is an open editorial question, logged in the Update Register.
For public discussion. Not affiliated with any political party. | generationalreset.org
The Generational Reset | In Discussion: Free Expression, Protest, and State Secrecy | For public discussion. Not affiliated with any political party. | generationalreset.org